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WRITING THE STATE: I THE SUPREME BY AUGUSTO ROA BASTOS 
 
John Kraniauskas 
(Birkbeck, University of the London) 
 
 
Introduction: ‘Is there a story?’ 
The story of Augusto Roa Bastos’s I the Supreme (1975) is quite difficult to reconstruct.1  
This is because of the ways in which meaning is organized, represented and distributed 
throughout the novel. In structuralist terms, its "discourse" and compositional procedures 
seem to dominate its ‘histoire’ or (hi)story. In I the Supreme, a novel about the origins of a 
state, a nation and a "people", readers are confronted with what is evidently a construction, 
made out of a variety of discursive materials and perspectives, as if attempting, from the 
two-dimensionality of the page, to produce an effect of three-dimensionality – in the 
tradition of cubist painting – in which conventional reading becomes more like a stuttered 
"scanning". The work, however, is not merely a static puzzle.  Even though the 
arrangement of the material functions to subvert the dominant discourse of El Supremo, 
the novel’s dictator (the narrative function of another ‘character’, the Compiler), the 
tension between textual fragmentation and textual unity – the one and the many texts – is, 
arguably, a discursive inflection of the attempt by the dictator to impose his own will/text 
(the "Perpetual Circular") on others.2  In what follows I will concentrate on the political 
and philosophical dimensions of this tension.3 
 
 "Detracing the path leading back through so many years, passing once again by way 
of low tricks and high treason, misfeance and malfeasance...", the voice of El Supremo 
emerges from the dead, and installs itself in the centre of power, the "House of 
Government".4 From here he watches, listens and orders society, engages with those 
voices that have made a "barbaric" myth of him (El Supremo re-writes history against the 
grain of regional liberal historiography), and traces the story of his eventual failure from 
the heights of the political.5 The following passage, situated towards the end of the novel, 
before the "last dictator" – the Tenebrion Obscurus – devours what remains of the dictator’s 
flesh, reveals and summarizes this narrative, condensing within it some of the work's most 
important themes, whilst also giving clues as to their significance: 
 
"There was another time, I remind myself, when I wrote, dictated, copied. I flung 
myself heart and soul into paper-and-ink work. Suddenly a full stop [punto]. An 
abrupt end to this abandon. The point [punto] at which the absolute begins to take 
on the form of history from the other side. At one time toward the beginning, I 
believed that I dictated, read, and worked under the sway [imperio] of universal 
reason, under the rule of my own sovereignty, under the dictates of the Absolute. I 
now ask myself: Who is the amanuensis? Not the trust-unworthy scribe, certainly." 
(410-411) 
This passage suggests that once upon a time ("another time... toward the beginning") El 
Supremo had a particular power, a sovereign power to decide; now, aware of his 
proximate demise, he realizes that he has lost it, that it may have been an illusion. A change 
has taken place that has put an end (a full stop [punto]) to what he refers to as the 
"absolute" giving birth to history ‘from the other side’, and now out of the dictator's 
control.  The implicit answer to his last question ("Who is the amanuensis?") is that now he 
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is the secretary – the "trust-unworthy scribe"; that he, rather than his amanuensis, Patiño, 
is being dictated to by history, and is to be written by, or rather, in it.6  The narrative thus 
traces a movement from a situation in which power is held – when El Supremo, as 
sovereign, dictates history – to another in which it is lost.  Historical change has now 
escaped his grasp/rule and undermined it. I the Supreme is thus a tragedy of sorts, telling 
the story, however phantasmatic or fictional, of a "rise and fall", of a certain (soverereign) 




As he narrates his story, El Supremo recalls the moment when as a young man he was 
expelled from school: the "rector" complains of his reading "the books and the ideas of 
those libertine impostors… the anti-Christs".  The young student answers, prefiguring his 
own modernizing political project after his country's independence from colonial rule: 
"You still want to destroy Newton with syllogisms… We, on the other hand, are 
endeavouring to make everything new with the help of masons such as Rousseau, 
Montesquieu, Diderot, Voltaire, and others as good as they are" (147). All are associated 
with the desacralising anti-Absolutist movement of the Enlightenment, widely read, 
although prohibited, in late eighteenth-century colonial Latin America, and influential in 
the formation of an independence-minded elite.  And it is this kind of language, the 
language of the Enlightenment, that informs El Supremo's description of his story. 
 
 What does El Supremo mean when he tells us that he thought he "dictated, read, 
and worked under the sway of universal reason, under the rule of my own sovereignty, 
under the dictates of the Absolute"? The Enlightenment had two dialectically related 
moments: in its negative aspect, influenced by advances in the natural and human 
sciences, it criticized sacred explanations of the universe and of absolutist monarchy; and 
in its positive aspect, it argued for the universality of reason, the sovereignty of the 
individual subject, and various rationally organized state forms, be they liberal, as in the 
case of Locke, or republican as in the case of Rousseau.7  What is involved politically is 
thus a re-distribution of "sovereignty", and the power it institutionalizes as legitimate, 
from one focussed on the authority of the sacred body of the absolutist monarch, to 
another "new" kind of body politic, now focussed on the "people" as citizens (Rousseau) or 
as self-interested "possessive" individuals (Locke). Each, however, as state form unified as 
nations. 8 Since, for the Enlightenment, reason was by definition universal, in the sense 
that everyone has it and that it is the same for everyone, it also became possible to think of 
planning a collective history of sorts, and, to be sure, rationally organising the state. This, 
El Supremo says, was his intention: "Removing from the chaos of the improbable the 
constellation possessed of probity. A State revolving on the axis of its sovereignty. The 
sovereign power of the people, nucleus of energy for the organization of the Republic" 
(97). The philosophical context of his discourse, therefore, is provided by emerging 
theories of the modern state associated with the Enlightenment; its political context being 
its conjunctural actualisation in the French Revolution and the Latin American struggles 
for independence and the creation of sovereign republics. In other words, the context and 
contents of El Supremo’s discourse is provided by the formation of modern bourgeois 
nation-states both in theory and in practice: "primitive political accumulation", in 
Althusser’s words, with all of the violence such a process involves.9  
 
 That El Supremo should mention Rousseau first amongst the above list of the 
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“illuminated” should come as no surprise.  His influence throughout Latin America was 
extensive, and although it is not certain whether Dr. Francia himself read Rousseau, El 
Supremo, Roa Bastos's fictional version, clearly has.10  Indeed he glosses Rousseau’s The 
Social Contract, almost exactly: 
 
"The multitude-people; in other words, the labouring-procreating populace 
produced all the goods and suffered all the ills. The rich reaped all the goods. Two 
apparently inseparable estates. Equally fatal to the common good: from the one 
came those responsible for tyranny; from the other, the tyrants… it’s precisely 
because the force of circumstances tends increasingly to destroy equality that the 
force of Revolution must always tend to maintain it. No one should be rich enough 
to buy another, and no one poor enough to find himself obliged to sell himself… I 
want to bring the extremes together… There is no equality without freedom… 
Those are the two ends that we must conjoin" (38).11 
  
Like Rousseau, El Supremo puts the general interest of the community above the private 
interests of individuals. In this sense, his project is decidedly anti-Liberal. In the historical 
context El Supremo is addressing this means it is aimed at the Buenos Aires elites 
(Porteñistas), from whose mercantile interests he defends the emerging nation.12  "(T)he 
force of circumstance" undermining equality (fundamental to the freedom desired by 
Rousseau and El Supremo) is constituted by the egoism ("amour-propre") or possessive 
individualism structuring civil society, and considered by classical liberal political theorists 
such as John Locke as the "natural rights" of "man" and the foundation of modern societies. 
In the latter's view, the state's function is merely to guarantee these rights, that is, private 
property and its corresponding notions of individual freedom (see Locke 327-344 and 
Macpherson). Rousseau, on the contrary, argued that private property was not a natural 
fact or right, but a social and historical phenomenon. For this reason, in his Discourse on 
the Origin of Inequality, the idea of a mythical "state of nature", in which there is no private 
property, has a historical and critical dimension that reveals that the egoistic pursuit of 
private interests in civil society is far from natural and which, furthermore, damages the 
freedom of the community.13 Hence the classical republican demand in Rousseau's work, 
taken up by the Jacobins in the French Revolution, not to mention El Supremo above, for 
an economy based on small peasant farms in which no one is so poor as to have to sell 
their labor (power) to another.  
 
 The political corollary of equality is a conception of freedom based on direct 
popular (peasant) democracy in which sovereignty lies with the people, the "general will".  
The "social contract" consists precisely in the recognition and imposition of this will over 
and above the Hobbesian chaos of the "will of all", that is, of contending private interests 
(and, of course, of Hobbes’s absolutist solution to it). These, for Rousseau, can only be 
realized morally, in and through the "general will", which is one and indivisible (rather 
than, for example, through the abolition of private property).  According to Étienne 
Balibar, Rousseau’s new notion of popular sovereignty is mediated by the idea of 
"community", whilst Locke’s is mediated by "property".14 The key question addressed by 
both Rousseau and El Supremo is thus: how to make virtuous citizens of private 
individuals such that they can exercize their sovereignty?  The answer, given its economic 
connotations and its character as an originary event (that is, the `social contact' as a self-
constituting moral community) is revolutionary. This is where Rousseau and El Supremo 
begin to part company.  For if the latter considers himself to be the mythic founder and 
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defender of a nation, a heroic deed in the republican tradition, his appropriation of the 
people's sovereignty – "I-am-the-State", El Supremo insists, re-absolutizing sovereign 
power – condemns him (el punto) to failure and betrayal (166). 
 
 The above quotation from Rousseau's The Social Contract in I the Supreme should 
not be read, therefore, as just another example of erudite intertextuality on Roa Bastos's 
part or as just a formal (meta-)compositional gesture, constitutive of the discourse of the 
novel.  The point is rather to see how the dilemmas of Rousseau's work are inscribed, 




The Social Contract provides the occasion for such a situation, relevant both to the context 
of post-Independence struggles to secure Paraguayan national sovereignty, as told in I the 
Supreme, as well as to the interpretation of the text itself. It does so in a character 
Rousseau calls the "Lawgiver", whose function is described as follows: 
 
"Laws are really nothing other than the conditions on which civil society exists.  A 
people, since it is subject to laws, ought to be the author of them. The right of laying 
down the rules of society belongs only to those who form the society; but how can 
they exercise it?... Who is to give it the foresight necessary to formulate enactments 
and proclaim them…?  How can a blind multitude, which often does not know what 
it wants, because it seldom knows what is good for it, undertake by itself an 
enterprise as vast and difficult as a system of legislation?  By themselves the people 
always will what is good, but by themselves they do not always discern it… It must 
be made to see things as they are, and sometimes as they should be seen; it must be 
shown the good path… Such public enlightenment would produce a union of 
understanding and will in the social body, bring the parts into perfect harmony and 
lift the whole to its fullest strength. Hence the necessity of a lawgiver."15  
 
In The Social Contract Rousseau's character, the Lawgiver, occupies the site of a series of 
tensions which Althusser calls "discrepancies" (décalages).16  For if the "people" are both 
the author of the "general will", which formalizes their sovereignty, and subjected to it, 
Rousseau also makes it clear that the "people" as such must be formed by `public 
enlightenment' for this to be the case.  In other words, the "people" both produce and are 
the product of the "social contract" (as Althusser suggests, Rousseau presupposes what he 
is supposed to be explaining).  The "people", on the one hand, institute the "general will" 
and, as sovereign, employ the Lawgiver to draft its law, but, on the other, are made or 
educated by them in order to do so: the Lawgiver must be ready to "change human nature, 
to transform each individual... into a part of a much greater whole".17 The Legislator is 
thus part of the Absolutist tradition, but turns against it. However, the character is also a 
fiction, invented to overcome the aporia in Rousseau's attempt to historicize the mythical 
and revolutionary origin of the `people' as sovereign subject.  This, as we shall see below, is 
the site occupied by Roa Bastos’s El Supremo. It also constitutes his drama: on the one 
hand, he writes in his “Private Notebook", "the people have made me their supreme 
potestate. Identified with it, what fear can we feel?" whilst, on the other, the function of his 
"Perpetual Circular" is to ensure the formation of a "people" with common knowledge of 
and investment in the nation's past and struggles for independence and freedom (166).18  
The Supreme Dictator is thus "in the service of the power that dominates" (40): impossibly 
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identified with those he is attempting to construct a civic and national identity for. In this 
sense, the place occupied by the Lawgiver and El Supremo is not, cannot be, one of identity, 
but of difference.  Paradoxically, however, it is from this very difference that the fiction of 
identity, the "people" and their nation, emerges (as a state production) 
 
 If we return to the above passage glossed from The Social Contract in I the Supreme, 
and compare it to Rousseau's original, it is now possible to appreciate an important 
variation relevant to the story narrated in the novel. Rather than the law (of the "people") 
acting to secure equality and freedom, as in Rousseau's text, El Supremo suggests that the 
Revolution, or more precisely, he ("I") would serve that function. This is the aporia of the 
Lawgiver at work: El Supremo usurps the "rule of law" as authored by the "people". In 
other words, he re-appropriates the "new" moment of citizenship back from the new 
political subject, only to return it to them as his invention and gift: he is the law (-giver) 
and they (the ‘people’) are now subjected to it.19 Roa Bastos’s resolution in I the Supreme 
of Rousseau's theoretical problem is twofold. First, a practical and Machiavellian one: he 
unites in one person what in Rousseau's work are kept as separate functions, the Lawgiver 
and the Prince; combining Rousseauian theory with Machiavellian practice. Together they 
form "the gigantic tree" of the absolute: re-distributed sovereignty re-appropriated.20   
 
 Roa Bastos's gloss of Rousseau's text, therefore, (a) provides the novel with a 
political model in which to inscribe the story of El Supremo (as Lawgiver and Prince), 
locating his drama within the context and dilemma constituted by the formation of a 
"people"; (b), it furnishes the story with a particular set of political contents that 
foreground the republican tradition of subordinating the "will of all" to the "general will", 
that is, the economic (private property) to the political (citizenship), which in turn, (c), 
makes it relevant to the arguments concerning the origins of the modern state in general 
and more particularly to the development of bourgeois nation-states in Latin America.21 
This, (d), clarifies the particular form in which El Supremo, as Lawgiver, believed he 
embodied the enlightenment ideals of sovereign redistribution, universal reason and the 
Absolute – here, Rousseau's "people", whose subjectivity as citizens he, nevertheless, 
betrays, re-appropriating the power of sovereign decision (law-making) that should lie 
with them. In this sense, (e), it is now possible to locate El Supremo's discourse-dictation: 
his words are, so to speak, the letter of the law, and the "Perpetual Circular", his legacy. 
 
 
To Read, To Write, To Represent 
But how did he embody these ideals?  If we return to Rousseau's text describing the 
Lawgiver, the answer to this question becomes evident. It is because he had the power of 
interpretation. This is Roa Bastos’s second resolution of Rousseau’s aporia: he can see 
what the people cannot: "the good". The "people", on the other hand, are blind. The history 
of this competence, "the foresight necessary" in Rousseau’s words, is traced in I the 
Supreme. Indeed, it describes his rise to power: before he can dictate he must be able to 
read and interpret signs, to see the "good" others cannot. 
 
As a child, the dictator reads nature for its secrets: 
 
"Rejected by human beings and even by animals, I gave myself over to books. Not to 
books of paper, to books of stones, plants. Above all, the famous stones of the 
Guayrá. Very crystalline stones" (280). 
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With these stones, El Supremo had wanted to make the alchemic "stone of stones: The 
Stone" in his laboratory (280).  He was not successful. We find out later in the novel, 
however, that he did manage to invent something "much better": 
 
"I discovered the line of perfect rectitude passing through all possible refractions. I 
fabricated a prism that could break a thought down into the seven colors of the 
spectrum. Then each one of them into seven others, until I caused a light to come 
forth that is white and black at the same time, there where those capable of 
conceiving only the double-opposite in all things see nothing more than a confused 
jumble of colours" (410). 
 
This "semiotic prism", perhaps a parody of Greimas’s "semiotic rectangle", is an 
instrument of decipherment and abstraction enhancing the gaze and interpretative 
faculties of the dictator, enabling him to read and impose order on thoughts, and to 
discover the basic semes (the minimum units of signification: black/white, etc.) 
constituting the deep binary structures that make meaning possible.22 It is this reading-
ability that, in giving El Supremo the power to see (and Roa Bastos the occasion to parody 
structuralism), makes his rise to power possible. Here, as reader of the sky – and it is from 
the sky that his power comes (as does writing), in the shape of a captured meteor – he tells 
his civil and military functionaries – and us, his readers – in the "Perpetual Circular" that: 
 
"I understood then that it is only by ripping this sort of thread of chance out of the 
weft of events that the impossible can be made possible. I suddenly realized that to-
be-able-to-do is to-be-abe-to-enable. At that instant a shooting star traced a 
luminous streak across the firmament… I had read somewhere that falling stars, 
meteors, aeroliths, are the very picture of chance in the universe. The force of 
power lies then, I thought, in chasing down chance: re-trapping it. Discovering its 
laws; that is to say, the laws of oblivion. Chance exists only because oblivion exists. 
Subject it to the law of counter-oblivion. Trace counter-chance" (95-96 – 
translation modified) 
 
Everything must be readable, that is, foreseeable, so that out of "chance", and against it, 
necessity ("law") may emerge. There are inscriptions everywhere to be decoded.  El 
Supremo must find and take hold of the "thread... of the weft of events" (or "plot" – trama 
in the Spanish original), and decipher the stories that surround him. Hence the importance 
of certain technologies of vision such as El Supremo's telescope (lente-de-ver-lejos) with 
which, once in power, he spies on the nation and reads the "book of Constellations", where 
he must continually keep an eye out for "chance". Indeed, the end of his power (the "fall") 
comes from the sky (upon high), when El Supremo is sucked into the mud (below), in the 
form of a flock of blind birds that fall at his feet. He is then "lost in two" ("I/HE") and 
overtaken by history, to become its object, or in historiography, its third-person: subject of 
enunciation and subject of the ennunciated (54, 420). 
 
 The importance of a specific competence, combined with instrumental reason, is 
underlined: "to-be-able-to-do is to-be-able-to-enable", or "poder hacer es hacer poder" in 
the Spanish, in which "to-be-able" [poder] also means power; thus, the "power-to-do is to 
makes power". Knowledge is thus intimately associated with power. In true Machiavellian 
fashion, "chance" ("fortune" in Machiavelli’s sense), as represented by the meteor, must be 
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captured in El Supremo's technologically enhanced gaze and controlled. Being able to read 
its traces in the sky, and decipher its message, is thus fundamental to the dictator's power 
on earth. He will capture chance (the meteor) and chain it to his desk. Doing so will ensure 
his position, from where he can counter chance's "writing" with his own (dictation). Thus 
El Supremo must not only be able to read, but also to write, so as to combat "chance", 
because interpretation is not enough if not re-encoded in writing: in other words, the 
dictator's writ must be "traced", that is, dictated. This is important to the dictator because 
chance has a subjective dimension too: forgetfulness, or "olvido", translated above as 
"oblivion". As Lawgiver, the dictator will have to dictate (his own) history, "trace counter-
chance", so that it will not be forgotten, and thereby produce new "enlightened" subjects, 
citizens aware of their past and the struggle for national independence: the virtuous 
cultural prerequisites of a sovereign and popular nation-state. A sense of "will" that is 
socially "general". In Étienne de la Boetie’s terms: freedom remembered, imposed and 
learned overcomes servitude. As it appears in the "Perpetual Circular" this history makes 
up a substantial part of the novel; it is what the reader consumes too as El Supremo 
dictates it to his secretary Patiño. However, it is too late, for the dictator is dead, his people 
still "blind" (the birds) and his "Perpetual Circular" the never-ending dictation, or 
"ramblings" in Alberto Moreiras’s terms, of a dead man.23  
 
 The historical context of this acquisition of interpretative power is that of a society 
emerging from a colonial province into the "chaos" of post-colonialism. El Supremo tells 
his readers how he participated in these developments, but also how he distanced himself 
from them.   He retires from the government twice, dissatisfied with the manoeuvrings of 
the creole military elite, and from his farm watches the post-colonial drama. To read and 
interpret "correctly" needs the perspective (here El Supremo's perspective and distance 
reminds us of the author's own exile) from which the eye can read the signs from a 
privileged location, as if looking through a telescope (lente-de-ver-lejos). Paradoxically, it is 
this distance that enables him to see and interpret (read) the "general will" of the people, 
and bring him close to what he was "looking for", the people and power: 
 
"Awake, I saw this dream vision: My rat nursery had turned into a caravan of men. I 
was walking at the head of this teaming multitude. We reached a column of black 
stone, in which a man was buried up to his armpits… Stuck fast there he appeared 
to be crying out to be dispetrified. The caravan behind strained and squeaked… I 
crossed the Plaza de Armas, followed by a growing crowd acclaiming my name. 
When I came back, I was another man.  I had learned a great deal at my farm-
lookout in Ybyray. The retreat had brought me closer to what I was seeking. From 
that point on I would yield to nothing and to no one opposed to the holy cause of 
the Fatherland… total autonomy, absolute sovereignty of my decisions. Training, 
under my command, of the forces necessary to see that they were obeyed... From 
the people-multitude I picked the men who formed the skeleton organization of the 
army of the people. An even more invincible support than that of cannons and rifles 
in the defence of the Republic and the Revolution" (163-165).  
 
I have already noted the ideological importance of Rousseau's text in providing I the 
Supreme with some of its political and historical content. The Social Contract also provides 
the novel with a complex hero relevant to this politics, the Lawgiver, which defines the 
relationship of the dictator with the "people". Here we would now seem to be in the 
presence of the dictator's fantastic narrative dramatization of his rise to power. It is the 
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consummation of the `social contract' itself as a revolutionary act: rats become "men" (the 
natural human species becomes explicitly social in constituting itself as a specific 
community through the "social pact" establishing the "general will"), and a ‘new’ once 
petrified subject makes its appearance on the stage of political history: the "people" as 
sovereign.24 With this pact a new order is established: a Republic. Here, however, with the 
dictator (Lawgiver + Prince) at its head as the privileged interpreter-subject of the 
"general will", representing and indeed appropriating sovereign power. It is HE (`ÉL') who 
comes to power out of the flux of events: the Supreme Subject. What is to be done? "[E]rect 
hierarchy in the midst of anarchy"– that is, construct a new sovereign independent and 
popular state (96). It is El Supremo's ability to read and interpret signs that gives him the 
power to represent (the "people").25 
 
 
The Supreme Dictator 
Returning to our passage summarising the story of the novel, I would like to make two 
points here. First, at the level of "content", we have arrived at its beginning, when, the 
dictator reminisces he labored, read and dictated under the signs of universal reason, the 
absolute and his own sovereignty, free from tutelage. In other words, we have arrived at 
the stage in his history in which, in Carl Schmitt’s terms, he decides, or, in the novel’s, when 
he dictates.26 The dictator, of course, will still need to read, but weight will now be shifted 
from the interpretation of signs to their ordering and dictation – to the production of 
discourse. He will be the privileged "supreme" practitioner: rather than just "interpreting 
the world", he will "change it" in the name of the "people-multitude". We are not to witness 
the "withering away of the state", however, as prefigured in the political philosophy of 
Rousseau, according to Lucio Colletti, but its post-colonial (national) re-construction.27  
 
 Second, a related but more formal point: a minimal story is usually considered to be 
constituted by three events: the first and last by moments of stasis and order; the second 
tracing a process of change, disrupting the harmony of the first order and marking a path 
of temporal movement and transformation towards the third. At the general level of the 
narrative, as summarized in the passage above, we find that in I the Supreme we are rather 
confronted by an inversion of this model: movement towards order which, we have been 
warned, is undermined by movement. Out of the flux, as the dictator sees it, of post-colonial 
Paraguay we are told about El Supremo's order which, in the end, as suggested by "the full 
stop", is overtaken by the implication of further change (the history and historiography of 
which the dictator has now become the object). 
 
 In the light of our argument so far, what does the dictator do? "I the Supreme 
Dictator of the Republic Order..." are the opening words of the novel, as they are of the 
"pasquinade" parodying the dictator's script and sentencing him and his functionaries to 
death or oblivion, informing readers right from its beginning about the dictator's role: it is 
both regulative and imperative (7). There are three interrelated ways in which El Supremo 
orders and dictates: politically, he is a republican Prince; pedagogically or culturally, he 
occupies the centre of the nation's symbolic order - he is the Lawgiver: "I am that 
PERSONAGE (personaje) and that NAME. Supreme incarnation of the race... I am the 
SUPREME PERSONAGE who watches over and protects your sleeping dream" (320); and 
semiotically, he is a writer of a story in which he is the main character (personaje). In what 
follows, I shall briefly conclude my observations focussing on the political and the 




 As dictator, El Supremo is positioned in the heights of post-enlightenment politics 
(or as Jean-Luc Nancy might say, its sovereign "summit"). Armed with his "telescope" in 
the House of Government, from where he surveys his realm, he reads the needs of the 
"people-multitude" and defends the nation from foreign interests in their name – because, 
as we have seen, in El Supremo's (and Rousseau's) view they are not equipped to 
represent themselves. In telling his story in the "Perpetual Circular", the dictator also 
narrates the constitution of a sovereign "people". But, in representing them as Lawgiver, 
he effectively takes their place. His presence, as dictator, entails their absence, like in 
linguistic representation: he is, in other words, their political sign. The people are 
moreover, at least in his story, complicit in the production of this sign, in the re-emergence 
of the "noxious weed" of absolutism: having elected El Supremo perpetual dictator, the 
"people" have given up (that is, forgotten) that sovereignty which, in republican thought, 
lies solely with them (267). In Étienne de la Boetie’s terms, I the Supreme is thus also a 
drama of "voluntary servitude", of what Roa Bastos will subsequently call "the 
monotheism of power"29: sovereignty reconceived as a broader – that is, cultural (or 
religious and theological) – state fetishism. 
 
 Inside Paraguay, however, El Supremo uses his position to undermine the 
economic and cultural power of the military-landowner-merchant alliance. He puts his and 
the peoples' enemies in prison, or even has them shot against the "orange tree". Under El 
Supremo's rule, the upper class suffer... and produce pamphlets and "pasquinades" (the 
primary sources for much of the Paraguayan historiography of the period of Dr. Francia's 
rule, its archive). The dictator, for his part, responds with his own "writing", putting a "full-
stop" to their "plots" so as to get on dictating his own: "Sudden full stop. Death blow to 
their logorrhea (parrafada). The avalanche of words meeting with a sudden quiet, the 
wordmongers with a sudden quietus. Not the full stop of a dot of black ink; the tiny black 
hole produced by a rifle cartridge in the breast of the enemies of the Fatherland is what 
counts. It admits of no reply. It rings out. The end. Finis" (61-62). It is this same "dot" 
(punto), of course, that eventually puts a "full-stop" (punto) to El Supremo's own dictation.  
 
 The absence in the novel of any kind of heroic or transcendental embodiment of the 
"people" is striking. In I the Supreme Roa Bastos has not subordinated his literary work to 
any easily identifiable political logic, "popular" or not, but instead dramatized the 
contradictions of a revolutionary dictatorship by working one side of the Rousseauian 
political structure occupied by the dictator (revolution) against the other (constitution) as 
Lawgiver. In sharp contrast to Roa Bastos’s first novel Hijo de Hombre ("Son of Man"), 
published in 1960, there are no Cristobal Jara’s or Macario’s in I the Supreme, models of 
political action and narration respectively. Instead, the appearance of popular characters 
has a transgressive or carnivalesque, rather than "exemplary", role. One such character is 
the unnamed "peasant". With the invasion of colonial Paraguay by Argentine forces led by 
Manuel Belgrano, the "Governor" decides to flee: "In order to keep from being recognized, 
he hunted up a peasant and gave the man his brigadier’s uniform in exchange for his rags. 
He also made him a present of his eyeglasses and his gold cigar holder. Then he hid 
himself… He left the Paraguayans to get along as best they could all by themselves". The 
creole leaders of the Paraguayan forces watch in awe as the "Governor" risks himself in 
battle, "disappearing at times and reappearing at others as though to lend the troops 
courage… They were amazed at the cleverness, the bold, completely unprecedented 
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courage of the governor, who had left his mount behind and hidden himself so well in the 
guise of this bearded, dark-skinned man with callused hands and bare feet" (106). The 
military chiefs manage, at last, to get the "Governor" back behind the lines where he could 
be more easily consulted: "The mute presence answered them with motions of his head, 
showing them all the ins and outs of how to trounce the enemy". Then a peasant appears, 
and the real "Governor" is unmasked.  The military leaders then turn to the man 
(un)dressed as the Governor: "And where did you come from? they ask the completely 
naked peasant, half dead with fear. I… the poor man murmurs covering his privates with 
his hands. I came… I just came to have myself a peek at all this pantomonium!" (106). 
  
 There are two points to be made with regard to this humorous episode: first, in 
momentarily donning the clothes of the representative of the Spanish Crown, the peasant, 
in carnivalesque fashion, turns the world up-side-down, signifying thus the emergence of a 
new sovereign subject. However, he does so, and this is the second point, inadvertently. 
Although he helps secure the victory of the Paraguayan forces, the event that inaugurates 
national independence is merely a "pantomonium", a harmless spectacle in which he may 
participate, but which is of no real concern. For the "peasant", the battle is anything but a 
transcendental event. His political presence is, as the text (the "Perpetual Circular") 
suggests, silent.  
 
 The structure of this episode thus repeats that of The Social Contract. Although 
"naturally" predisposed to sovereignty – he is the "good" – the peasant is nevertheless 
"blind" to its meaning. In other words, he is only "unconsciously" free. El Supremo will, 
nevertheless, represent him, be his sign, and speak for him. He will dictate for him and in 
his name, so as to defend popular interest from the creole economic and military elites. In 
this sense, following the Rousseauian political tradition, El Supremo occupies that 
extremely problematic jacobin space of the political avant-garde, dictating for those who 
supposedly cannot (for whatever reason) represent or govern for themselves. And this is 
what perhaps makes I the Supreme unique, for at one and the same time it dramatizes in 
literary form the origins of a state as well as the contradictions of political representation 
in the context of revolution.  
 
 If we now return to the passage glossed by El Supremo from Rousseau’s The Social 
Contract with which we began, it becomes clear that the text not only quotes Rousseau but 
rewrites him too, underlining the tension between revolution and constitution that 
characterizes his work, in the light of Marx; that is, according to Balibar’s account of 
political modernity, in the retrospective light of the historical emergence of "the people’s 
people", the working class.30 This is the significance of what Roa Bastos has El Supremo 
refer to in his version of Rousseau's text as "the labouring-procreating populace". Such a 
transformation of Rousseau’s text has both political and historical significance. It pulls El 
Supremo’s discourse (dictation) into the present of his writing and literary construction by 
Roa Bastos, such that the story of the novel might resonate with the revolutionary 
enthusiasm emerging in the Argentina of the late 1960s and early 1970s when I the 
Supreme was composed. In this sense, the novel projects its postcolonial drama of 
revolution-and-constitution into its fictional future, most notably, for example, in the figure 
of the "montonera" guerrilla-woman María de los Ángeles who, in the novel, returns from 
exile to set revolutionary time going again. This same gesture works in the opposite 
direction too, as historical anachronism: Roa Bastos's "addition" to Rousseau tells us that 
the novel simultaneously projects its author’s present back into the fictional past of its 
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dictator, El Supremo. It appears there in the form of the Compiler. 
 
 El Supremo is also a dictator in the pedagogic sense, for he "dictates" (dicta) classes, 
a common expression in the Spanish language. For example, he "dictates" a "writing 
lesson" to his amanuensis Patiño, who is unable to adequately transcribe the real meaning 
of the dictator's voice (his dictation) representing the unrecorded voice of the people not 
included in the historical archive. He also, as we have seen, dictates a "history lesson": 
insofar as it narrates the story of the Revolution, the "Perpetual Circular" is designed to 
produce new citizen-subjects imbued with a sense of national identity and political 
purpose. When bringing his (s)tory to an end, he underlines its importance for the future 
of the nation: "Reflect at length on these points that constitute the foundation of our 
Republic. Focal points of its progress into the future. I want chiefs, delegates, 
administrators who are skilled in their various functions. I want to find integrity, austerity, 
valor, honesty in each of you". They are to follow his own virtuous example. He then 
informs them that there is to be a Congress in September so that "the Supreme 
Government may be strengthened and made uniform" (369). It is too late, however, for the 
dictator dies. It is at this point that El Supremo's dead dog Sultán, "shaking off the dirt" 
from his skull, also returns from the dead, to accuse him of the death of his servant "Pilar 
the black" – an ex-slave whose freedom was bought by the dictator – and of betraying the 
"people" (374). Sultán forces El Supremo to write about Pilar and the dictator agrees, for, 
he says, "letters couldn’t care less whether what is written with them is true or false" 
(378). This is the point at which El Supremo becomes history’s "amenuensis", and is now 
dictated to. 
 
 Pilar was also the beneficiary of El Supremo's instruction: he receives a "reading 
lesson". The dictator teaches his servant to read the skies (from where, as we have seen, 
his own power comes) with his "telescope" (an instrument of that power). The sky, in El 
Supremo's view, is also a mirror of souls.  Pilar's reading lesson is, therefore, a lesson in 
"almastronomy" too: "A meaning is hidden in each thing. A sign in each man", says the 
dictator. "What is yours, Sire?", asks Pilar. "Capricorn", he answers. After the lesson, El 
Supremo muses that "The black won’t get past Capricorn… His false inventiveness keeps 
him stuck fast (clavado) in treacherous irreverence" (379). And the dictator is right, 
although it is he that is at first "stuck fast" or "stopped… dead" (the two translations of 
clavado in the English-language version of the novel): 
 
"One afternoon, on returning from my outing, astonishment stopped me dead in my 
tracks at the office door. Wearing my dress uniform, the black was sitting at my 
desk dictating, in strident tones, the most outlandish decrees to an invisible scribe… 
The worst of it is that in the hallucination of my anger I see in that emaciated black 
a perfect portrait of myself! He is faultlessly imitating my own voice, my 
appearance... He gets to his feet… Takes out the thick file containing the trail 
records of the Conspiracy of the year ’20… screaming insults at each of the sixty-
eight traitors put to death… He leaps upon me... Dances round me… forcing me to 
play a role in the farce being staged by this monkey disguised as the Supreme 
Dictator of a Nation. One after the other, in a dizzying whirl, he transforms himself 
into each of the sixty-eight traitors put to death. It is they who insult me now, curse 
me, judge me… Sixty-eight voices from beyond the grave, commingled in a single 
shriek from the black. Guards!" (382-383) 
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Pilar's carnivalesque mimicry of El Supremo reveals that it was not necessary for him to be 
able to read beyond "Capricorn", the dictator’s sign.  Indeed, in this case, El Supremo’s 
reading lesson seems to have worked all too well, for Pilar was able to interpret his 
"significance", perform it, and put it on show. In having at one and the same time occupied, 
parodied and judged the Lawgiver, however, Pilar is, unlike the silent "peasant", executed 
for his interpretative pains.  El Supremo thus re-imposes his own power to judge. This 
"point" (or "full stop") in El Supremo’s dictation-dictatorship, however, also marks its end. 
 
 It is a beast’s voice, Sultan's, and not that of a peasant, that finally condemns El 
Supremo in the novel.  In the dog's view "Pilar the black was the only free being" to live at 
the dictator’s side: "He found everything good in what you call everything evil; from the 
line round his middle downward. Do you consider that the waterline of what you keep 
pompously referring to as the arguments of Universal Reason?" (386). As we saw above, it 
was from "the sway [imperio] of universal reason", its new "empire", that El Supremo 
thought he dictated.  But then, he says, "suddenly a full stop". The "full stop" here, of 
course, is the one that puts an end to Pilar's parodic discourse, to his own "logorrhea".  It is 
also the one that marks the limits of Enlightenment rationality as El Supremo’s radical 
political project runs aground on the very constituency it supposedly represents (the fate, 
need it be said, of cultural enlightenment throughout Latin America and elsewhere).  In the 
end, says Sultán to the dictator:  
 
"You kept at a distance the people from whom you received power and 
sovereignty: well fed, protected, taught fear and veneration, because in your heart 
of hearts you too feared the people but did not venerate it. You turned yourself into 
a Great Obscurity for the people-mob [gente-muchedumbre]; into the great Don-
Amo, the Lord-and-Master who demands docility in return for a full belly and an 
empty head" (423).  
 
This accusation is not only a critique of El Supremo’s version of the Rousseauian political 
project – "You stopped halfway and did not form true revolutionary leaders…" – but also a 
suggestion that in his very betrayal of the `people' he was instrumental in creating the 
chimeric myth that outlived him (that, even, the very notion of the ‘people’ itself may be 
such a constitutional fantasy).  Sultán even attacks the very competence that enables El 
Supremo to dictate, his interpretative power; that is, his ability to read: "You misread the 
will of the People [voluntad del Común]" says the dog, “and as a consequence you misused 
your power [obraste mal]". In the end, as El Supremo's micro-narrative of his political 
career makes clear, it is he that is to be written by history and not the other way round.  
Sultán condemns him to having to return from the dead, to account [contar] for his actions 
and respond to history (historiography): ‘Oblivion [olvido] will devour the others. You, ex 
Supreme, are the one who must render an account of everything and pay up to the last 
quarter…’ (423). It is in compliance with this condemnation that the novel – and El 
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NOTES 
 
1. For example, Alberto Moreiras writes: "There is no story line in Yo el Supremo. Its 
many pages give us the ramblings of a fellow who is either dead or dying" (74). The 
quotation I have used as my subtitle is the opening line of Ricardo Piglia's novel 
Artificial Respiration (Respiración artificial) in which the tension between "historia" as 
story and "historia" as history is dramatized - a tension performed in I the Supreme too. 
Formally and compositionally, I the Supreme is a precursor of Artificial Respiration. 
2. The Compiler, however, also feeds the text with a cinematic desire for four-
dimensionality: movement back and forth in time. From this perspective, its 
compositional principle is that of montage. 
3. The story of the novel as told by the Supreme Dictator in his "Perpetual Circular" is 
the story of the independence of a nation and its transformation into a republic. It 
doubles, however, as the biography of the dictator – that is, of dictation and dictatorship 
– himself. Roa Bastos has used Julio Chaves’s biography of El Supremo as both his 
narrative model, which he more or less parodies and reproduces, and as his 
historiographical resource. In this sense, I the Supreme is both a criticism of history as 
well as of its writing up as historiography. 
4. Augusto Roa Bastos, I the Supreme, trans. Helen Lane (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 
321 (all subsequent references to the novel will be included in the text in parenthesis). As 
brilliantly noted by Alain Sicard, this is why in the novel "la Révolution 'involue' á la 
recherche d'elle-meme. C'est cette 'involution' qui... engendre l'espace Romanesque" 
(788). 
5. "The House of Government was turned into a receptacle that received the vibrations 
of all of Paraguay…” (44). For an account of Argentine revisionist historiography, see 
Tulio Halperin Donghi, El revisionismo histórico argentino como visión decadentista de la 
historia nacional (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 2002). Jean-Luc Nancy has 
recently insisted on how tropes associated with "height" feed the idea of sovereignty as 
the "summit" of the political. See his “Ex nihilio summum (Acerca de la soberanía)”, in La 
creación del mundo o la mundialización (Barcelona: Paidós, 2003), 121. 
6. In both senses: he becomes an object of History and of historiography. It is to challenge 
the later that he has "returned" – this, in a sense, is the founding fictional moment of I the 
Supreme: the return (as revenant) of the dictator of Paraguay between 1811 and 1840 and 
"hero" of its independence, Dr José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia. Like all revenants he too 
seeks justice. 
7. In "What is Enlightenment?" Kant writes: "Enlightenment is man's release from his 
self-incurred tutelage.  Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding 
without direction from another… Sapere ande! 'Have courage to use your own reason!' – 
that is the motto of enlightenment." See Immanuel Kant, On History, edited by L. W. Beck 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1981), 3.  
8. For the transfer of sovereignty to the "people" as a body politic, see Eric Santner, The 
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Royal Remains: The People’s Two Bodies and the Endgames of Sovereignty (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 2011).  
9. Louis Althusser, Machiavelli and Us, trans. by Greg Elliot (London and New York: 
Verso, 1999), 125.  
10. In "Autocracia o Democracia" Roa Bastos insists that "Dr. Francia... did not read 
Rousseau, as I had his imaginary double do, the character from the novel" (my translation).  
He refers the reader, however, to Irala Burgo’s La ideología del Dr. Francia, which suggests, 
through a reading of a Note of July 20, 1811 sent to the "President and members of the 
Ruling Junta of Buenos Aires", and signed, amongst others, by Dr. Francia, that in fact he 
may have read Rousseau’s text, or at least known its arguments quite well. 
11. Here is Rousseau's original: "If we enquire wherein lies precisely the greatest good of 
all... we shall find that it comes down to two main objects, freedom and equality... equality 
because freedom cannot survive without it... this word must not be taken to imply that 
degrees of power and wealth should be absolutely the same for all, but rather that no 
citizen shall be rich enough to buy another and none so poor as to be forced to sell 
himself... Do you want coherence in the state?  Then bring the two extremes as close 
together as possible; have neither rich men nor beggars... from the one class comes friends 
of tyrants, from the other, tyrants... Such equality, we shall be told, is a chimera of theory 
and could not exist in reality... Precisely because the force of circumstances tends always to 
destroy equality, the force of legislation ought always tend to preserve it". See his The 
Social Contract (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975), 96-97. 
12. This is what also makes of El Supremo a kind of nationalist and revisionist hero. 
Apart from glossing Rousseau, he also ridicules Bartolomé Mitre – who will later 
become the President of Argentina as well as a key architect of the War of the Triple 
Alliance (1865-1870) against Paraguay and an important liberal historian. 
13. In “Discourse on the Origin of Inequality”, Rousseau writes: "The first man who, 
having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying 'This is mine', and found 
people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society". In The Social 
Contract and Discourses (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1973), 76. Of course, Hegel and 
Marx refer to the latter as ‘bourgeois society’. 
14. Étienne Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies on Politics and Philosophy before and 
after Marx (London: Routledge, 1994). vii-59.  
15. Rousseau, The Social Contract, 83. 
16. The theoretical problem in Rousseau’s text is the "social contract" itself qua 
contract; the discrepancies are its theoretical effects which serve, each in its own way, 
to disavow the original problem: the idea of a social contract presupposes its subjects. 
According to Althusser, Rousseau later flees from the "failure" of political philosophy to 
the "triumphs" of "fiction" in his later novels such as Emile, or On Eductation and Julie, or 
the New Heloise (160) – much as Roa Bastos has done in I the Supreme, but via 
Rousseau’s own fictional supplement in The Social Contract itself, which he generalizes 
as a problem for revolutionary politics as a whole (but which Althusser, interestingly, 
does not mention in his own critical analysis). See his "Rousseau: The Social Contract 
(The Discrepancies)," in Politics and History: Montesquieu, Rousseau, Marx (London and 
New York: Verso, 2007), 113-160. 
17. Rousseau, The Social Contract, 84. 
18. The Rennaissance writer Étienne de la Boetie is also mentioned in I the Supreme (71). 
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In his view, people live in ‘voluntary servitude’ because they have forgotten that they were 
once free – hence, perhaps, the importance of memory in the novel. 
19. Étienne Balibar shows how the modern concept of the “subject”, as both the active 
subject of an action, and as that which is dominated, emerges at the same time as the 
post-enlightenment re-distribution of sovereignty discussed here. See his Citoyen Sujet 
et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
2011), 1-84. 
20. In Rousseau’s words, "The lawgiver is the engineer who invents the machine; the 
prince is merely the mechanic who sets it up and operates it’ (The Social Contract, 84). The 
novel's parodic evocation of Machiavelli's The Prince rightly occurs in one of the many 
moments El Supremo is underlining the importance of "the birth of the Nation, the 
formation of the Republic". He says: "Only I know how many times it was necessary to add 
a bit of fox fur when the lion’s skin rampant on the shield of the Republic wasn’t enough to 
cover its ass" (24). In Machiavelli's political manual for Princes, he suggests that they must 
learn from the beasts: `he must learn from the fox and the lion' – the former because of its 
cunning, and the latter because of its power (99).  
21. For a discussion of the effects of this on Latin American literature, see my Políticas 
literarias: poder y acumulación en la literatura y el cine latinoamericanos (Mexico City: 
FLACSO, 2012). 
22. See Greimas, A. J. and Courtes, J. Semiotics and Language: An Analytic Dictionary 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982). 
23. Moreiras, “A Beggaring Description”, 74. 
24. Rousseau, The Social Contract, 49-68. 
25. In this regard, the novel might also be interpreted as providing a critical, fictional 
account of populism as it is set out, for example, in the work of Ernesto Laclau – as well 
as setting out its historical and political conditions within the republican tradition. 
Indeed, the work of Roa Bastos emerges in the 1940s in a developing and overlapping - 
Argentine and Paraguayan - context of populist ruptures (associated with generals Juan 
Domingo Perón and Alfredo Stroessner, who, on important occasions, helped each other 
out). 
26. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1996), 19-81. 
27. See Lucio Colletti. “Rousseau as a Critic of ‘Civil Society’”, in From Rousseau to Lenin 
(London: New Left Books, 1972), 143-193. 
28. I make some preliminary observations on the dictator’s writing in Políticas literarias, 
97-109. 
29. This is the term Roa Bastos uses to name his Paraguayan trilogy of novels: Hijo de 
hombre, Yo el Supremo and El fiscal. 
30. See Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas.  For Roa Bastos’s views on the political 
conjuncture in which he was writing the novel, see his "América Latina en Marcha". 
Echoing the language of El Supremos’s revolutionary enthusiasm, Roa Bastos over-
optimistically writes: "At a time in which, having crushed an anti-popular and 
repressive system precisely because it was allied with foreign imperialism and local 
oligarchies whose agents have been rightly labelled forces of occupation...; at a time in 
which this popular will is translated into acts of sovereign power…, or its definitive 
relocation amongst the countries of the Third World struggling for their liberation 
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under the sign of revolutionary socialism… Latin America’s second emancipation is 
unfolding [está en marcha]. Its wave is overwhelming. No force on earth can stop it 
now" (my translation). On the political horizon at the time is the foreseen return of 
General Perón, the conflict between Peronisms of the Right and Left, rural and urban 
protest and guerrilla warfare, and the unforeseen ferocious military coup of 1976, one 
year after the publication of I the Supreme, that will put an end to the enthusiasm and 
dreams of Roa Bastos and so many others. 
